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Abstract
This study tests guilt aversion by experimentally eliciting guilt sensitivity of villagers in
Bangladesh and evaluating its impact on real-world behavior. In a trust game with hidden
action, villagers in this study are asked about their reciprocal behavior toward seven
potential opponents with different levels of trusting belief. Guilt sensitivity is elicited from
the threshold belief to switch from selfish to reciprocal behavior. It appears that males
exhibit higher guilt sensitivity. I also find robust supporting evidence for guilt aversion but
not for pure altruism or trustworthiness; guilt-averse villagers can borrow from and repay to
community members after a disaster. Individuals also suffer less from property crime in
villages with a higher guilt-sensitivity neighborhood. However, guilt sensitivity is
uncorrelated with contribution to community events. A potential reason for the insignificant
effect is discussed.
JEL Codes: C91; C93; K42
Keywords: Guilt aversion; peer effects; antisocial behavior; experiment; Bangladesh
* This study was financially supported by KAKENHI Grant Number 16K03657 from the
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (PI: Masahiro Shoji). The author would like to
express gratitude to Klaus Abbink, Yukihiko Funaki, Jonathan Morduch, Alistair Munro, and
Tomomi Tanaka for their valuable comments. This paper also benefited from the comments
of Koichi Hamada, Yoko Kijima, Takashi Kurosaki, Takeshi Murooka, Yoshitaka Okano,
Yasuyuki Sawada, and Kan Takeuchi. Special thanks are due to the seminar participants at
the Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES), Chuo University, Association for
Public Economic Theory (PET), National Graduate Institute For Policy Studies,
Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Developing Economies, the Japanese Economic
Association, Meeting on Applied Economics and Data Analysis, National Taiwan University,
Osaka University, Seijo University, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics
(SABE), Tohoku University, Tokyo Metropolitan University, the University of Tokyo,
Waseda University, and Yokohama National University. The author is also grateful to
Naonori Kusakabe and Data Analysis and Technical Assistance Ltd. for their valuable
cooperation in the household survey and experiment. The usual disclaimer applies.
** 6-1-20 Seijo, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 157-8511, Japan. +81(3)3482-5936, Email:
shoji@seijo.ac.jp
21. Introduction
Social preference, such as altruism, cooperativeness, and trustworthiness, has been
recognized as vital to underpinning human society since the time of Adam Smith (Smith
1759). This argument has been tested in the literature with the recent development of
economic experiments; social preference is shown to have positive effects on real-world
behavior, such as living standards, labor market outcomes, creditworthiness, and common
resource management (Karlan 2005; Bouma et al. 2008; Barr and Serneels 2009; Carpenter
and Seki 2011; Carter and Castillo 2011; Fehr and Leibbrandt 2011; Sawada et al.
2013Kosfeld and Rustagi 2015).
Likewise, economic analyses on guilt are increasing. The guilt aversion preference
of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) considers that an individual feels guilty and experiences
utility loss if he/she believes his/her behavior falls short of someone’s expectation and lets the
person down. This concept was theoretically formalized by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007),
and extended to experimental studies by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Miettinen and
Suetens (2008), Vanberg (2008), Reuben et al. (2009), Ellingsen et al. (2010, 2012),
Bellemare et al. (2011), Dufwenberg et al. (2011), Battigalli et al. (2013), Beck et al. (2013),
and Kawagoe and Narita (2014), among others.
While insightful, these previous studies face three remaining issues. First, it is not
well known to what extent guilt aversion explains real-world behavior relative to other social
preference. This is important because, unlike pure altruism and trustworthiness, guilt aversion
is belief-dependent, providing different implications for researchers and policymakers.
Second, the experiments in the previous studies are not designed to elicit guilt sensitivity of
individuals, a preference parameter that allows us to distinguish guilt aversion from other
social preference. Finally, even among the experimental studies there is no consensus whether
the behavioral patterns of individuals are consistent with guilt aversion.
3The goal of this study is to test the validity of guilt aversion in the real world, by
developing a unique experimental approach to elicit the guilt sensitivity parameter. I elicit the
sensitivity by conducting a trust game with hidden action, which is frequently used in the
literature pertaining to guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, 2010, 2011; Vanberg
2008; Ellingsen, et al. 2010; Kawagoe and Narita 2014). Then, I combine the experimental
result with the survey data collected from the subject households to examine the association
between the sensitivity and real-world behavior. To the best of my knowledge, this study is
the first to elicit guilt sensitivity and to test guilt aversion in a real-world setting.
In addition, this study attempts to contribute to the literature by addressing two
major issues in experimental studies. First, there is little experimental evidence from
developing countries particularly in the literature on guilt aversion. Second, in many studies,
the subjects are self-selected to participate in the experiment, causing estimation results to be
biased. By contrast, my experiment was conducted among 288 randomly selected households
in rural Bangladesh, of which 279 participated in the experiment and household survey. It is
particularly insightful to study the impact of guilt in developing countries, since they have
long grappled with problems arising from ineffective law enforcement. Therefore, intrinsic
motivation plays a significant role in facilitating normative behavior in such areas.
To preview the result, the villagers’ guilt sensitivity has significant causal effects on
their real-world behavior, whereas pure altruism or trustworthiness does not; after a disaster,
guilt-averse individuals can borrow from and repay informal sources, such as neighbors and
relatives, and are less likely to be bound by credit constraint. This is in line with the finding
of Karlan (2005). In addition, the risk of crime victimization is lower in villages with
guilt-averse neighbors. By contrast, intriguingly, guilt aversion does not predict behavioral
patterns regarding contribution to community events.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the
4experimental design to elicit guilt sensitivity. Section 3 investigates the causal effect of guilt
sensitivity on real-world behavior. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Experimental Design and Results
2.1. Procedure and Participants
The study site is Satkhira district in southwestern Bangladesh. This district suffers from
ineffective law enforcement and formal credit/insurance markets, as in other parts of
developing countries. Therefore, social preference of villagers plays an important role in
facilitating normative behavior, such as mutual help and crime control. This is particularly
true after the district was hit by a devastating cyclone in May 2009 and opportunities for both
crime incidence and mutual help increased.
In this district, 288 households from 16 rural villages are randomly sampled.1 Of the
288 sampled households, 285 participated in a household survey in December 2010 (1.5
years after the cyclone).2 Then, in August 2011, the heads of the survey households were
invited to participate in an economic experiment that used real money. In cases in which the
household head was not available, the next senior person representing the household (usually
the spouse) was recruited to maintain the sample size. Ultimately, 279 of the 285 households
participated in the experiment. This study uses the survey and experimental data collected
1 In the first stage of stratified random sampling, I select the two sub-districts (Upazila) of
Kaliganj and Ashashoni based on their socio-economic status and the intensity of cyclone
damage. In the second stage, I randomly sample two unions from each sub-district. “Union”
is an administrative unit in Bangladesh. Each union includes multiple villages. In the next
stage, four villages from each union and one cluster from each of the villages are randomly
selected. Finally, 18 households from each cluster are chosen.
2 The questionnaire covers data from January 2009 until December 2010 on the magnitude of
cyclone damage, crime incidence, self-reported social capital, socio-economic status,
membership of microfinance institutions, and relationship with the other sample households.
5from these households.
Panels A and B of Table 1 present the subject and household characteristics of
experiment participants, respectively. The average participant is 36 years old and has 6 years
of schooling. 56% of subjects are household heads and the others are mainly wives or sons of
the head. Participants’ working place was inundated for 1 month as a result of a 2-foot
cyclone. After the cyclone, 26% of households borrowed from informal sources, such as
neighbors and friends, at zero interest. Finally, 45% of households were victims of property
crime.
The experiments were conducted at the local government offices over 8 days. A total
of 36 subjects from two villages were invited per day and were randomly allocated to two
rooms, so that each room includes nine subjects from each village. Each subject participated
in five games, such as the take-away games, dictator game, trust game with hidden action,
risk preference game, and trust game with complete information. However, this study
employs the results of the dictator game and trust game with hidden action only. Table 2
provides an overview of the experiments. The experimenters were hired in Bangladesh, and
since participants had an average of 6 years of schooling, the experimenters explained the
experimental design slowly and carefully.
Each subject received his/her payoff from only one randomly selected decision after
finishing all the games. Therefore, the subjects did not know the decision from which they
received the payoff and were aware that each subject had earned money from a different
decision. This is important for two reasons. First, it alleviates the correlation of choices
within subjects across games due to the wealth effect. Second, if subjects were to earn money
from all games and discuss the payoffs after the experiment, they might have been able to
infer the choices of the other subjects. This would have violated subject anonymity,
potentially affecting behavior.
6[Table 1]
[Table 2]
2.2. Trust Game with Hidden Action
In order to elicit guilt sensitivity at the individual level, I conduct a trust game with hidden
action. This game is commonly used in the guilt-aversion literature (Charness and
Dufwenberg 2006, 2010, 2011; Vanberg 2008; Ellingsen et al., 2010; Kawagoe and Narita
2014). Therefore, while the elicited guilt sensitivity would be sensitive to experimental
design, I still consider this the most suitable game.
The structure of the game is summarized in Figure 1. A detailed description of the
experiment implementation is presented in the online appendix. Each subject is paired with a
randomly chosen anonymous opponent in the other experiment room. It is explained to the
participants that the opponent player in this game is not the same as the opponents in the prior
games. The participants are assigned as Players A and B. This game has three stages. First,
Player A chooses In or Out. If he/she chooses Out, the game is over, and both subjects receive
Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) 100 each. If In is chosen, the game proceeds to the second stage, in
which Player B chooses either Roll the die or Don’t roll. If Player B does not roll the die,
he/she earns BDT 280, while the paired Player A receives BDT 0. If Player B decides to roll
the die, the game proceeds to the third stage, in which Player B’s payoff is BDT 200,
regardless of the face of the die. However, Player A’s payoff depends on the face of the die.
Player A receives nothing if the face shows 1 and BDT 240 otherwise.
This study applies the strategy method; after all the subjects make decisions about the
role of Player A, they make decisions as Player B. All the subjects are asked four questions.
First, as Player A, they are asked to choose In or Out. Second, they are asked how many out
of the 18 subjects in the other room will roll the die if he/she chooses In. Recall that the
7subjects are told that they are paired with 1 of the 18 subjects. Therefore, this question elicits
the first-order belief about Player B’s trustworthiness.3 Third, as Player B this time, all the
subjects decide whether to roll the die, conditional on Player A choosing In. This question is
used to elicit the subjects’ trustworthiness. Finally, the experimenters explain that there are
seven potential Player As, and they exhibit different levels of belief about Roll the die: 0%,
16.7%, 33.3%, 50%, 66.7%, 83.3%, and 100%. For example, in case of the third opponent
with the belief being 33.3%, the following is explained to the subjects: Player A expects that
6 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which option will you choose?4
The subjects are asked their decisions for each potential opponent.5
In this experimental design, the set of Don’t roll by Player B and Out by Player A
satisfies a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium regardless of Player A’s belief.
[Figure 1]
2.3. Elicitation Method and Result
Guilt sensitivity is elicited from behavioral patterns in the last question about the role of
Player B. If Player B does not roll the die even though the paired Player A trusts him/her to
3 Belief-elicitation experiments usually reward accuracy of stated beliefs in addition to
payments for other decisions, but this study does not, as this approach potentially affects
participants’ incentives in a different way (Blanco et al. 2010; Gächter and Renner 2010).
4 In order to help uneducated subjects understand the experiment setting, the experimenters
explained the belief using the proportion of individuals who are anticipated to roll the die
rather than the probability, as described in the experiment script in the online appendix.
5 In other words, I use the strategy method regarding the level of the first-order belief.
Although the strategy method has some potential concerns, Brandts and Charness (2011)
claim, based on a large number of previous studies, that the results of the strategy and
direct-response methods are comparable. Amdur and Schmick (2012) show that the feeling of
guilt does not differ between the cases of direct-response and strategy methods.
8do so, it lets Player A down. According to the concept of guilt aversion of Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006), this causes Player B to feel disutility of guilt. The level of disutility
depends on the extent to which Player B believes his/her choice lets Player A down.
To explain this argument more clearly, suppose ρA represents Player A’s belief about
Roll the die, conditional on Player A choosing In. Since the expected material payoff for
Player A is BDT 200 when Player B rolls the die, Player A expects BDT 200ρA when
choosing In. However, if Player B chooses Don’t roll, Player A yields nothing. Thus, if Player
B does not roll the die, his/her choice will let Player A down by BDT 200ρA. However, since
ρ
A is unobservable for Player B, he/she does not know exactly by how much his/her choice
lets Player A down. Hence, he/she makes decisions based on his/her expectation about ρA,
which is denoted by ρB. In other words, ρA and ρB are the first- and second-order belief about
Roll the die, respectively. This causes Player B to achieve utility as much as BDT 280–
200ρBg by choosing not to roll the die, where g represents the guilt sensitivity parameter. If
this utility exceeds the utility obtained from rolling the die (BDT 200), Player B will not roll
the die. This implies that Player B rolls the die if and only if ρBg>0.4. Therefore, subjects
with a certain level of guilt sensitivity should switch their choice from Don’t roll to Roll the
die as ρB increases. The switching point varies depending on their guilt sensitivity.
Furthermore, this experimental design has another preferable feature. Since ρB is
endogenous for Player B, it suffers from (false) consensus effects if ρB is used to analyze
Player B’s behavior. However, since this study provides Player B with information on Player
A’s first-order belief, this procedure assures that the first- and second-order beliefs coincide,
that is, ρA = ρB = ρ, reducing the scope for such effects.6
By exploiting the experimental design, I compute four indicators of guilt sensitivity.
6 The strategy to inform Player A’s first-order belief to Player B was first suggested by
Ellingsen et al. (2010).
9The first is an indicator assuming linear guilt disutility, where Player B’s utility from not
rolling the die is characterized by 280–200ρg. This utility function is consistent with
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and other studies, and therefore, is useful as a benchmark.
However, the anticipated payoff for Player A when choosing In becomes lower than that
when choosing Out, if ρ < 0.5. Such a low belief might not be credible for Player B, causing
the elicited guilt sensitivity to be inaccurate. Therefore, I use the responses to 4 potential
opponents with ρ≥ 0.5 and compute the second sensitivity variable, which takes unity if the
subject always rolls the die in this range, and zero otherwise. This is equivalent to the
indicator taking unity if the first indicator is equal to or greater than one. The third indicator
assumes quadratic guilt disutility, that is, 280–(200ρ)2g, implying that the marginal disutility
of guilt increases with the level of letting Player A down. Finally, the last indicator assumes
logarithmic disutility, that is, 280–log(200ρ)g, considering the opposite tendency from the
third indicator (decreasing marginal disutility).
The experimental results are presented in Table 3. The first two columns present the
switching points. The third column shows the corresponding range of guilt sensitivity when
linear disutility is assumed. The fourth column is the level of sensitivity used for the
empirical analyses. Finally, the last column presents the breakdown of sensitivity. Table 3
shows three noteworthy points. First, more than 40% of subjects switch their behavior from
self-interested to trustworthy manner at 50% or 67% of belief. Second, 26.5% of subjects
choose Roll the die even when Player A’s belief is zero. This cannot be explained simply by
guilt aversion, because the net gain from choosing Don’t roll is positive regardless of guilt
sensitivity. Rather, this is consistent with pure altruism and trustworthiness, implying that the
indicator of guilt sensitivity partially captures these characteristics. The econometric analysis
in Section 3 addresses this concern by controlling for the indicators of pure altruism and
trustworthiness. Third, 11 subjects (3.9%) switch their answers to the opposite or switch
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multiple times. These observations are not used in the empirical analyses.
The summary statistics of guilt sensitivity and the other experimental results are
reported in Panel C of Table 1. The average subject anticipates that 10.8 out of 18 subjects in
the other experimental room will roll the die if he/she chooses In, implying that the mean
first-order belief is 60%.
[Table 3]
2.4. Dictator Game
In addition to the trust game with hidden action, the dictator game is conducted to elicit the
pure altruism of subjects. The experimental design follows that of Forsythe et al. (1994). This
game is played anonymously by a randomly matched pair of participants, referred to as the
dictator and recipient. When the game starts, the experimenters provide an endowment of
BDT 400 to the dictator and nothing to the recipient. The dictator can then allocate BDT 400,
350, 300, 250, 200, 150, 100, 50, or 0 to the recipient. The extent of pure altruism is
measured by the proportion of endowment allocated to the dictator’s recipient.7 This study
elicits this preference parameter from all participants by using the strategy method across the
roles in the game. The average subject allocates 46% of endowment to the recipient (Table 1).
2.5. Determinants of Guilt Sensitivity
This section examines the association between guilt sensitivity and subjects’ socio-economic
and demographic characteristics. The following OLS model is estimated:
Guiltvi = α0 + α1 Prefvi + α2 Xvi + ωv + εvi (1)
where Guiltvi is the guilt sensitivity of individual i in village v; Pref denotes the level of pure
7 Since this game is conducted after a take-away game, the rule is explained in this context.
See the online appendix for details.
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altruism and trustworthiness; X denotes household and subject characteristics, such as
socio-economic status and demographics; ω is village fixed effects; and finally, ε is the
residual.
Table 4 shows the result. Predictably, sensitivity is strongly correlated with the level
of pure altruism and trustworthiness. On the other hand, it is uncorrelated with the other
covariates, such as socio-economic status. The only significant determinant is the sex of
subjects. Males exhibit higher guilt sensitivity. These results suggest that guilt sensitivity is
not necessarily formed through life experience, but is determined by individuals’
predisposition.
[Table 4]
3. Guilt Sensitivity to Predict Real-World Behavior
3.1. Credit Accessibility and Repayment
First, we examine the impact of guilt sensitivity on credit accessibility and creditworthiness.
In developing countries, like Bangladesh, access to formal credit and insurance is limited.
Therefore, villagers rely on borrowing from informal sources, such as friends and relatives, to
smooth consumption. Since such informal lenders do not charge interest rates and a formal
scheme to enforce repayment does not exist, the borrower’s social preference plays a critical
role in whether he/she repays, and therefore, in whether he/she can borrow. For example,
Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) show that the risk-sharing arrangement in the rural economy is
likely to be inefficient if individuals are self-interested. Karlan (2005) also finds that
microfinance members with higher trustworthiness are less likely to default on their loans.
Since the study site was hit by a cyclone before the survey, the demand for loans should be
particularly high during the survey period.
This argument leads to the following testable hypotheses; those with higher guilt
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sensitivity are (1) more likely to be able to borrow from informal sources, (2) more likely to
repay the informal loans, and (3) less likely to bind the credit constraint. The term “credit
constraint” refers to excess demand for consumption and investment credit with respect to the
overall market, including formal and informal lenders. In Figure 2, households are defined as
credit constrained if they borrowed money but could not borrow sufficiently, or if they did
not borrow from any sources because their credit applications were rejected, they feared
default, or they did not have sufficient credit sources. Furthermore, households were credit
unconstrained when they borrowed the required amount, or when they did not borrow
because they did not need to. The indicator of credit constraint is measured from the survey in
that manner. This is a simplified version of the direct eliciting methodology of Boucher et al.
(2009).
[Figure 2]
These hypotheses are tested by estimating the following OLS model:
Lvi = α0 + α1 Guiltvi + α2 Prefvi + α3 Xvi + ωv + εvi (2)
where, Lvi denotes the credit accessibility and creditworthiness of household i in village v,
namely (1) a dummy for borrowing from informal sources without interest rate after the
cyclone, (2) a dummy for repaying at least a part of the received informal loans by the survey
period, and (3) a dummy for being bound by credit constraint. Pref is included in the
specification to mitigate the possibility of omitted variable bias; it could be correlated with
both guilt sensitivity and credit accessibility.
Table 5 presents the results, showing that those with higher guilt sensitivity are more
likely to be able to borrow from informal sources, and they repay the informal loans,
supporting H1 and H2, respectively. In addition, they are less likely to be bound by credit
constraint, which supports H3. Furthermore, these results are robust to the choice of guilt
sensitivity. By contrast, pure altruism or trustworthiness does not explain the heterogeneity of
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credit accessibility across households. The full estimation results are reported in Table A1 in
the online appendix.
It should be noted that since the experiment is conducted after the household survey,
this specification might be influenced by reverse causality; the experience of borrowing
might have affected guilt sensitivity. Unfortunately, it is difficult to rule out this possibility in
this specification. Therefore, I examine the next outcome variable below, as the reverse
causality is less likely to affect the interpretation of the estimation result.
[Table 5]
3.2. Neighbors’ Guilt Sensitivity and Crime Victimization
This subsection examines the validity of guilt sensitivity by predicting crime incidence.
Guilt-sensitive individuals should be less likely to commit crimes. However, in practice, it is
difficult to collect accurate data on crimes committed by the survey respondents, as they
might not report their true crime experience. Therefore, I examine the determinants of
victimization by following Gaviria and Pagés (2002) and Barslund et al. (2007). Exploiting
the fact that 64% of crimes in Bangladesh occur between peers in the same community
(Faruk and Khatun 2008), I test whether individuals residing in more guilt-averse
neighborhoods are less likely to be victims of crime.8
The following OLS model is estimated:
Vsvi =α0 + α1 Guiltsvi + α2 Prefsvi + α3 VGuiltsv + α4 Vprefsv + α5 Xsvi + δs + εvi (3)
where Vsvi takes unity if household i in village v of sub-district s experienced victimization of
property crimes after the cyclone, and zero otherwise. Vguiltsv and Vprefsv indicate the mean
levels of Guiltsvi and Prefsvi in the village, respectively. δs denotes the sub-district fixed effects.
8 I assume that criminals reside in the same community as the victim. The validity of this
assumption in the study area is discussed by Shoji (2017).
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I control for the preference parameters of household i (Guiltsvi and Prefsvi) to mitigate reverse
causality; while the experience of victimization might affect the preference of i, these
variables capture this effect. The hypothesis here indicates that α3 < 0. Table 6 shows that the
coefficients of mean guilt sensitivity are negative and statistically significant, except the
logarithmic disutility, supporting the hypothesis. Again, the data do not fit the hypothesis of
pure altruism or trustworthiness. The full estimation results are reported at Table A2 in the
online appendix.
[Table 6]
3.3. Contribution to Community Events
Finally, I examine the role of guilt in the contribution to community events. The empirical
model is analogous to Subsection 3.1, except that the dependent variables are (1) the
household’s average hours per month spent participating in community work, such as
religious festivals, and (2) household expenditure for ceremonies per month. Guilt-averse
individuals might contribute more to the community, so that they do not let the other
community members down. However, Table 7 presents the results counter to this expectation.
None of the coefficients of guilt sensitivity is statistically significant. This cannot be
explained by reverse causality, since it should cause upward bias. The full estimation results
are reported in Table A3 in the online appendix. I discuss potential reasons for the
insignificant effects in the next section.
[Table 7]
4. Conclusions
Guilt aversion has been tested in many studies, with mixed results. By exploiting a
new experimental approach and data on real-world behavior, this study provides supporting
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evidence for guilt aversion. It shows that those with higher guilt sensitivity can borrow from
informal sources and repay the informal loans. In addition, individuals suffer from less
property crime in villages with a higher guilt-sensitivity neighborhood. By contrast, it appears
that the elicited guilt sensitivity does not explain the contribution to community events.
Why does guilt aversion not facilitate contribution to community events? Although it
is difficult to test this rigorously with my data, a likely explanation is that an individual’s
contribution to community events is beneficial for multiple villagers, while loan repayment
and theft are bilateral transactions. Therefore, the attitude to guilt in such a setting may not be
well manipulated via a two-player game. It might rather be suitable to elicit sensitivity from a
public goods game to predict the contribution to community events. In order to draw
conclusions regarding this question, further studies examining different outcomes and
different elicitation methods are required.
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Fig. 1. Structure of the Trust Game with Hidden Action
Fig. 2. Questionnaire design for credit constraint module
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D.
Panel A: Subject characteristics
1 if subject is household head 0.56 0.50
1 if subject is male 0.70 0.46
Age of subject 35.81 13.71
Schooling years of subject 5.84 4.07
Panel B: Household Characteristics
Large assets (BDT 106) 0.16 0.39
Small assets (BDT 106) 0.03 0.05
Age of head (102 years) 0.44 0.13
Schooling years of head 4.56 3.91
1 if head is married 0.90 0.30
Household size 4.22 1.55
Proportion of males over 15 in the household 0.37 0.18
1 if Muslim 0.50 0.50
Duration of inundation at working place (months) 0.98 1.27
Height of inundation at working place (feet) 2.07 1.91
Distance to market (km) 1.50 1.23
1 if borrowed from informal sources after cyclone 0.26 0.44
1 if started to repay the informal loans 0.22 0.41
1 if binding the credit constraint during the survey period 0.09 0.29
1 if victimized by property crime after cyclone 0.45 0.50
Log (hours per month for community work) 3.40 1.08
Log(expenditure for ceremonies per month) 3.88 1.49
Panel C: Experimental Results
Trust (dummy for choosing In) 0.71 0.45
Trusting belief (guess for the number of subjects rolling the die) 10.80 5.29
Trustworthiness (dummy for choosing Roll the die) 0.59 0.49
Guilt sensitivity: linear 1.32 0.82
Guilt sensitivity: binary 0.37 0.49
Guilt sensitivity: quadratic 0.03 0.03
Guilt sensitivity: logarithmic 17.81 3.65
Altruism (% allocated to the recipient in the dictator game) 46.15 31.47
Observations 279
Guilt sensitivity variables include only 268 observations as explained in the text.
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Table 2: Overview of Experiments and Tasks in Each Game
Tasks
Take away game (Session 1)
Only the opponent subject receives BDT 400 from the experimenter. Decide the amount to take
away from him/her.
Take away game (Session 2)
Receive BDT 400 from the experimenter. Guess the amount that the opponent will take away from
the subject.
Dictator game
Receive BDT 400 from the experimenter. Decide the amount to allocate to the paired opponent.
Take away game (Session 3)
Only the opponent subject receives BDT 400 from the experimenter. Decide the amount to take
away from him/her.
Trust game with hidden action
1. Play the role of Player A. Choose In or Out.
2. Guess the probability that paired Player B chooses Roll the die.
3. Play the role of Player B. Choose Roll the die or Don’t Roll.
4-10. After the first order beliefs of seven potential opponents are informed, choose Roll the die or
Don’t Roll for each opponent.
Risk preference game
Receive BDT 300 and a die from the experimenter. Decide the amount to bet on the die.
Trust game with complete information
1. Play the role of first mover. Receive BDT 300 from the experimenter. Decide the amount to
invest in an anonymous opponent.
2-9. After the names of eight potential opponents are informed, decide the amount to invest in each
opponent.
10. Play the role of second mover. Receive money from the paired anonymous first mover. Decide
the amount to return to him/her.
11-18. After the names of eight potential first movers are informed, decide the amount to return to
each of them.
All the subjects played all the games, and in each game, they played all the roles. The results of take away
games, risk preference game, and trust game with complete information are not used in this study.
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Table 3: Switching Point and Inferred Guilt Sensitivity (N = 279)
Range of belief to choose Range of guilt
sensitivity (linear
disutility)
Guilt sensitivity
in this study
(Guilt)
Proportion
(%)
Roll the die Don’t roll
None 0~18
(0~100%)
0 < g < 0.4 0.2 8.2
18
(100%)
0~15
(0~83%)
0.4 < g < 0.48 0.44 2.5
15~18
(83~100%)
0~12
(0~67%)
0.48 < g < 0.6 0.54 5.0
12~18
(67~100%)
0~9
(0~50%)
0.6 < g < 0.8 0.7 21.9
9~18
(50~100%)
0~6
(0~33%)
0.8 < g < 1.2 1.0 22.6
6~18
(33~100%)
0~3
(0~17%)
1.2 < g < 2.4 1.8 3.6
3~18
(17~100%)
0
(0%)
2.4 < g 2.4 5.7
0~18
(0~100%)
None Guilt aversion with
altruism or
trustworthiness
2.4 26.5
Others# Missing 3.9
Notes. The sensitivity parameter is elicited from all participants (279 individuals). # indicates that these
subjects switched their answers to the opposite or switched multiple times. These observations are not used
in the regression analyses.
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Table 4: Determinants of Guilt Sensitivity
(1) (2) (3)
1 if subject is household head -0.0396 -0.0668 -0.1284
(0.099) (0.113) (0.107)
1 if subject is male 0.2564 0.3008* 0.2867**
(0.151) (0.159) (0.101)
Age of subject -0.0064 -0.0056 -0.0003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Schooling years of subject -0.0150 -0.0091 -0.0048
(0.019) (0.022) (0.018)
Large assets (BDT 106) -0.0969 -0.0560
(0.150) (0.099)
Small assets (BDT 106) 0.2389 -0.2767
(1.119) (0.977)
Age of head (102 years) 1.6994 0.0559
(2.108) (2.178)
Squared age of head -2.4051 -0.5031
(2.250) (2.324)
Schooling years of head -0.0044 0.0042
(0.017) (0.017)
1 if head is married -0.1288 -0.1049
(0.204) (0.173)
Household size -0.0122 -0.0430
(0.039) (0.030)
Proportion of males over 15 in the household 0.2703 -0.0203
(0.330) (0.267)
1 if Muslim -0.3123 -0.2305
(0.201) (0.193)
Duration of inundation at working place (months) -0.0156 0.0200
(0.056) (0.037)
Height of inundation at working place (feet) 0.0146 0.0105
(0.041) (0.030)
Distance to market (km) 0.1072 0.1008
(0.076) (0.058)
Altruism 0.0031*
(0.002)
Trustworthiness 0.7909***
(0.102)
Observations 268 268 268
R-squared 0.109 0.137 0.343
Village FE Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 5: Credit Accessibility and Repayment
Borrowed from informal sources Repaid Credit constraint
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Guilt sensitivity (linear) 0.130*** 0.090** -0.039**
(0.030) (0.036) (0.016)
Guilt sensitivity (binary) 0.212*** 0.144** -0.053*
(0.049) (0.062) (0.028)
Guilt sensitivity (quadratic) 3.559*** 2.415** -0.999**
(0.811) (1.000) (0.462)
Guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) 0.017** 0.014* -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Altruism -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trustworthiness -0.037 -0.018 -0.028 -0.001 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.034 -0.035 -0.045 -0.039 -0.046
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.081) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.080) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.207 0.179 0.201 0.199 0.201 0.190 0.293 0.291 0.293 0.288
Controlling for X? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 6: Victimization of Property Crime
Victimization of property crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Village guilt sensitivity (linear) -0.3723**
(0.132)
Village guilt sensitivity (binary) -0.5337***
(0.136)
Village guilt sensitivity (quadratic) -9.6846***
(3.213)
Village guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) -0.0535
(0.035)
Village altruism 0.0040 0.0033 0.0043 0.0007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Village trustworthiness 0.1956 0.1668 0.1859 0.1425
(0.176) (0.182) (0.177) (0.202)
Guilt sensitivity (linear) 0.0376
(0.039)
Guilt sensitivity (binary) 0.0678
(0.061)
Guilt sensitivity (quadratic) 1.0716
(1.038)
Guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) 0.0050
(0.008)
Altruism 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trustworthiness 0.0676 0.0728 0.0702 0.0760
(0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.067)
Observations 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.109 0.111 0.109 0.100
Controlling for X? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 7: Contribution to Community Events
Log(hours per month for community work) Log(expenditure for ceremonies per month)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Guilt sensitivity (linear) -0.128 0.072
(0.086) (0.116)
Guilt sensitivity (binary) -0.157 0.215
(0.144) (0.222)
Guilt sensitivity (quadratic) -2.733 2.948
(2.303) (3.335)
Guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) -0.036 -0.008
(0.024) (0.016)
Altruism -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trustworthiness 0.232 0.192 0.203 0.269 -0.203 -0.230 -0.223 -0.116
(0.166) (0.142) (0.149) (0.220) (0.212) (0.211) (0.211) (0.202)
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.280 0.277 0.278 0.284 0.254 0.257 0.256 0.254
Controlling for X? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Online Appendix
1. Instructions of Experiment
Welcome Speech
Thank you all for coming and for your cooperation in the last survey in January. We are also
grateful for your cooperation today. We would like to offer an opportunity to make money.
Today you play some games and earn money depending on the score you get in the games.
There are 18 participants in this room and another 18 in the other room. The amount you
receive depends on what you and the other participants do in the games. We want to
emphasize that real money is at stake and we strongly recommend you to try to understand
the games and play seriously as much as possible. It will take a total of 5 to 6 hours to play all
games. After completing them, one of them will be chosen by rolling a die. You receive the
money corresponding to your score in the selected game. Keep in mind that you receive
money for only one game. The payment will be after completing all games. None of the other
participants will know how much money you earn or what you do during the games. We will
never tell anyone. To assure that your responses are confidential, we ask you not to talk about
the games until all games are completed. If you follow this rule, we will give you 100 Tk
each at the end of games as participation fee, in addition to the payoff in the games. However,
if you talk to other participants or do not follow the rules in any other way, we will reduce the
payment. If you do not wish to participate in the games for any reasons, you are free to leave
now. Is there anybody who does not want to participate today?
Instruction for the Take-away Game (Session 1)
Skipped.
Instruction for the Dictator Game
Finally, in Question 6, the rule is a little bit different. Please listen carefully. You are
Player A and have BDT 400, but this time, Player B cannot take away money from you.
Instead, you can give some money to him if you wish. If you give nothing, his payoff is zero.
If you give BDT 100, he gets BDT 100 and you get BDT 300. Keep in mind that your partner
in this game should be different from the one in the last game.
Instruction for the Take-away Game (Session 2)
Skipped.
Instruction for the Trust Game with Hidden Action
[Show the modified version of Figure 1 with only the material payoff reported] Now we are
starting the next game. This game is played by two people: Player A and Player B. This time
you are assigned to be Player A. Each of you is paired with somebody in the other room. This
game has three stages. In the first stage, you choose In or Out. If you choose Out, the game is
over immediately, and both of you receive BDT 100 for sure. If you choose In, the game
proceeds to the second stage where Player B chooses Roll the die or Don’t roll. If Player B
chooses not to roll the die, he gets BDT 280, while you get nothing. If Player B rolls the die,
his payoff is BDT 200 for certain, but your payoff depends on the face of the die. If the face
shows 1, you receive nothing. If the face of the die shows any of the other faces, you receive
BDT 240.
Therefore, if Player B rolls a die, he/she can earn BDT 200 for sure. However, you
might get BDT 240 or nothing, depending on the face of the die. If Player B chooses not to
roll the die in the second stage, he gets BDT 280, but you get nothing. In the first stage, if you
choose Out, you get BDT 100 for sure. Thus, suppose you choose In in the first stage. You get
as much as BDT 240, only if Player B actually rolls the die and the die lands on 2 to 6. On the
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other hand, if Player B chooses not to roll the die, or if he/she rolls the die and it lands on 1,
then you get nothing.
This is the beginning part of the answer sheet. First, in Question H-1, you are Player
A. Please choose In or Out [Show the answer sheet and read Question H-1]. If you choose
Out, you get BDT 100 for sure. If you choose In, you might get BDT 240 or nothing,
depending on Player B’s decision and the face of the die.
[H-1] Suppose you are Player A, which option will you choose?
Next comes Question H-2 [Show the answer sheet for Question H-2]. There are 18
participants in the other room, and you are playing the game with one of them. Please guess
how many people in the other room will roll the die if you choose In. The answer can be
nobody, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, or everybody.
[H-2] There are 18 people who can be paired with you. If you are Player A and choose In,
how many of the 18 participants do you think will roll the die?
In Question H-3, this time, you are Player B, and you choose whether to roll the die.
If you roll it, you get BDT 200 and Player A gets BDT 240 or nothing. If you don’t roll the
die, you get BDT 280 and Player A gets nothing [Show the answer sheet and read Question
H-3]. Please circle your answer on this sheet.
[H-3] If you are Player B and Player A chooses In, then which option will you choose?
[Show the answer sheet for Question H-4] Finally, suppose you are Player B and the
paired Player A chose In. When Player A chose In, he/she was anticipating how likely it was
for people in this room to roll the die. There are seven participants with different levels of
anticipation, and you are paired with one of them. For example, the first person anticipates
that nobody would roll the die. The second person expects that three people in this room will
roll the die, and the person in the middle expects that half of you will roll the die. Finally, the
last person expects that all of you will roll the die.
Please choose whether or not to roll the die for each of the seven potential opponents.
You are playing this game with one of them. Finally, please roll this die after answering all
the questions. Everyone must roll the die, because this procedure guarantees that no one can
infer your decision. If your choice is Don’t roll, the face of the die has no impact on the
payoffs.
Questions
[H-4] Player A expects that none of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then,
which option will you choose?
[H-5] Player A expects that 3 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which
option will you choose?
[H-6] Player A expects that 6 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which
option will you choose?
[H-7] Player A expects that 9 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then, which
option will you choose?
[H-8] Player A expects that 12 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then,
which option will you choose?
[H-9] Player A expects that 15 of the 18 participants in this room will roll the die. Then,
which option will you choose?
[H-10] Player A expects that everybody will roll the die. Then, which option will you choose?
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Table A1: Full Estimation Results of Table 5
Borrowed from informal sources Repaid Credit constraint
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Guilt sensitivity (linear) 0.130*** 0.090** -0.039**
(0.030) (0.036) (0.016)
Guilt sensitivity (binary) 0.212*** 0.144** -0.053*
(0.049) (0.062) (0.028)
Guilt sensitivity (quadratic) 3.559*** 2.415** -0.999**
(0.811) (1.000) (0.462)
Guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) 0.017** 0.014* -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Altruism -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Trustworthiness -0.037 -0.018 -0.028 -0.001 0.018 0.033 0.026 0.034 -0.035 -0.045 -0.039 -0.046
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.081) (0.071) (0.068) (0.068) (0.080) (0.026) (0.030) (0.028) (0.029)
Large assets -0.040 -0.040 -0.037 -0.049 -0.044 -0.044 -0.042 -0.051 -0.058** -0.057** -0.058** -0.055**
(0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.060) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Small assets 0.929 0.851 0.922 0.930 0.721 0.668 0.716 0.727 0.792* 0.814* 0.795* 0.792**
(0.717) (0.729) (0.725) (0.686) (0.654) (0.668) (0.662) (0.613) (0.383) (0.390) (0.388) (0.365)
Age of head 0.319 0.206 0.252 0.407 -0.145 -0.221 -0.190 -0.073 -0.980 -0.952 -0.962 -1.007
(1.124) (1.150) (1.134) (1.117) (0.931) (0.956) (0.946) (0.903) (1.017) (1.036) (1.025) (1.027)
Squared age of head -0.490 -0.394 -0.427 -0.625 -0.038 0.026 0.004 -0.141 1.010 0.989 0.993 1.050
(1.088) (1.113) (1.098) (1.086) (0.876) (0.902) (0.892) (0.849) (0.991) (1.012) (0.999) (1.007)
Schooling years of head 0.022** 0.023** 0.023** 0.020* 0.025** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1 if head is married -0.032 -0.039 -0.037 -0.031 0.047 0.042 0.043 0.049 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.011
(0.083) (0.083) (0.082) (0.086) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.051) (0.071) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070)
Household size -0.010 -0.008 -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.017 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Proportion of males over 15 -0.056 -0.048 -0.052 -0.051 -0.081 -0.076 -0.079 -0.077 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.030
in the household (0.155) (0.153) (0.153) (0.156) (0.166) (0.167) (0.166) (0.165) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111)
1 if Muslim 0.056 0.047 0.058 0.040 0.122 0.115 0.123 0.112 -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.013
(0.113) (0.110) (0.113) (0.113) (0.098) (0.096) (0.098) (0.095) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.046)
Duration of inundation 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.019 0.023 0.024 0.025 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.012 0.014
at working place (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
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Height of inundation -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
at working place (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Distance to market 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.027 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.025 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
1 if subject is household head 0.060 0.062 0.060 0.046 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.027
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
1 if subject is male 0.058 0.061 0.054 0.085 0.088 0.091 0.086 0.106* -0.050 -0.053 -0.050 -0.058
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.063) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.056) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) (0.051)
Age of subject -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Schooling years of subject -0.018** -0.019** -0.018** -0.018* -0.016* -0.016* -0.016* -0.015* 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.207 0.179 0.201 0.199 0.201 0.190 0.293 0.291 0.293 0.288
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
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Table A2: Full Estimation Results of Table 6
Victimization of property crime
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Village guilt sensitivity (linear) -0.3723**
(0.132)
Village guilt sensitivity (binary) -0.5337***
(0.136)
Village guilt sensitivity (quadratic) -9.6846***
(3.213)
Village guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) -0.0535
(0.035)
Village altruism 0.0040 0.0033 0.0043 0.0007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Village trustworthiness 0.1956 0.1668 0.1859 0.1425
(0.176) (0.182) (0.177) (0.202)
Guilt sensitivity (linear) 0.0376
(0.039)
Guilt sensitivity (binary) 0.0678
(0.061)
Guilt sensitivity (quadratic) 1.0716
(1.038)
Guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) 0.0050
(0.008)
Altruism 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Trustworthiness 0.0676 0.0728 0.0702 0.0760
(0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.067)
Large assets -0.0781 -0.0832 -0.0762 -0.0857
(0.123) (0.124) (0.124) (0.122)
Small assets -0.0021 -0.0371 -0.0077 -0.0064
(0.482) (0.489) (0.481) (0.497)
Age of head -0.1914 -0.0837 -0.1552 -0.2871
(1.231) (1.217) (1.214) (1.260)
Squared age of head 0.2013 0.0742 0.1623 0.2912
(1.201) (1.189) (1.184) (1.237)
Schooling years of head 0.0284*** 0.0282*** 0.0286*** 0.0285***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
1 if head is married -0.0147 -0.0118 -0.0145 -0.0209
(0.094) (0.092) (0.093) (0.094)
Household size -0.0344 -0.0347 -0.0343 -0.0344
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Proportion of males over 15 -0.1476 -0.1491 -0.1503 -0.1104
in the household (0.154) (0.149) (0.153) (0.152)
1 if Muslim -0.0014 0.0087 0.0011 0.0159
(0.058) (0.054) (0.058) (0.060)
Duration of inundation -0.0222 -0.0196 -0.0213 -0.0248
at working place (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
Height of inundation 0.0637*** 0.0616*** 0.0627** 0.0664***
at working place (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Distance to market -0.0503* -0.0494* -0.0499* -0.0406
(0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032)
1 if subject is household head -0.1725* -0.1643* -0.1721* -0.1672
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.096)
1 if subject is male 0.0504 0.0493 0.0501 0.0428
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(0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.095)
Age of subject 0.0030 0.0032 0.0031 0.0026
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Schooling years of subject -0.0112 -0.0093 -0.0107 -0.0113
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.109 0.111 0.109 0.100
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table A3: Full Estimation Results of Table 7
Log(hours per month for community work) Log(expenditure for ceremonies per month)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Guilt sensitivity (linear) -0.128 0.072
(0.086) (0.116)
Guilt sensitivity (binary) -0.157 0.215
(0.144) (0.222)
Guilt sensitivity (quadratic) -2.733 2.948
(2.303) (3.335)
Guilt sensitivity (logarithmic) -0.036 -0.008
(0.024) (0.016)
Altruism -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Trustworthiness 0.232 0.192 0.203 0.269 -0.203 -0.230 -0.223 -0.116
(0.166) (0.142) (0.149) (0.220) (0.212) (0.211) (0.211) (0.202)
Large assets -0.078 -0.076 -0.079 -0.066 0.588*** 0.591*** 0.592*** 0.585***
(0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.128) (0.165) (0.173) (0.166) (0.164)
Small assets 2.195 2.261 2.207 2.152 4.239** 4.177** 4.244** 4.202**
(1.807) (1.828) (1.808) (1.848) (1.842) (1.822) (1.825) (1.884)
Age of head 6.490** 6.573** 6.541** 6.317** -4.456 -4.574 -4.514 -4.488
(2.454) (2.458) (2.463) (2.376) (3.142) (3.131) (3.150) (3.131)
Squared age of head -6.307** -6.363** -6.342** -6.099** 5.333 5.461 5.404 5.329
(2.220) (2.230) (2.229) (2.150) (3.538) (3.516) (3.542) (3.508)
Schooling years of head 0.043* 0.042* 0.042* 0.047* 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.032
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
1 if head is married -0.203 -0.195 -0.196 -0.219 0.193 0.192 0.192 0.179
(0.180) (0.174) (0.176) (0.182) (0.183) (0.176) (0.179) (0.191)
Household size 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.114 0.119 0.116 0.110
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.100)
Proportion of males over 15 0.859** 0.854** 0.857** 0.846** 0.834 0.842 0.837 0.829
in the household (0.352) (0.354) (0.353) (0.347) (0.686) (0.688) (0.687) (0.676)
1 if Muslim 0.174 0.187 0.179 0.175 -0.492 -0.486 -0.481 -0.515
(0.269) (0.271) (0.268) (0.269) (0.371) (0.361) (0.363) (0.384)
Duration of inundation -0.030 -0.031 -0.032 -0.019 -0.109 -0.110 -0.108 -0.105
at working place (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) (0.087) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.116)
Height of inundation 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006
at working place (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.100) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100)
Distance to market 0.167 0.162 0.164 0.167 -0.062 -0.065 -0.065 -0.051
(0.110) (0.111) (0.111) (0.107) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133)
1 if subject is household head 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.019 -0.301 -0.292 -0.297 -0.312
(0.171) (0.173) (0.171) (0.170) (0.206) (0.203) (0.205) (0.216)
1 if subject is male -0.027 -0.039 -0.033 -0.044 0.122 0.108 0.109 0.147
(0.172) (0.172) (0.175) (0.159) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) (0.285)
Age of subject 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Schooling years of subject 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 268 268 268 268 268 268 268 268
R-squared 0.280 0.277 0.278 0.284 0.254 0.257 0.256 0.254
Village FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The OLS coefficients are reported, and the clustered robust standard errors at the village level are in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
